Abstract
Abstract
This study explores the strategic importance of semiconductors as the cornerstone of advanced technologies, which are intrinsically linked to economic competitiveness and military superiority. As a result, semiconductors have emerged as a central arena of geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. In an effort to curb China's technological rise, the United States has pursued a containment strategy by establishing strategic chokepoints designed to restrict China's access to advanced semiconductor technologies. Nevertheless, China has sought to counter and mitigate the impact of this strategy through the adoption of technological nationalism and the pursuit of greater technological self-reliance. Against this backdrop, the study addresses the following research question: How have semiconductors transformed from a commercial commodity into a fundamental pillar of national security and a strategic instrument of hegemony in the international system? The study adopts both the analytical approach and the futures foresight methodology to examine this transformation and its implications for the evolving global
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